ABSTRACT Nowadays, artificial intelligence technologies (e.g., deep neural networks) have been used widely in the Internet of Things (IoT) to provide smart services and sensing data processing. The evolving neural network even exceeds the human cognitive level. However, the accuracy of these structures depends to some extent on the accuracy of the training data. Some well-designed generated antagonistic disturbances are sufficient to deceive model when added to images. Such attacks cause the classifiers trained by the neural network to misidentify the object and thus completely fail. On the other hand, the various existing defensive methods that have been proposed suffer from two criticisms. The first thing that bears the brunt is unsatisfactory detection rate due to low robustness toward the adversarial sample. Second, the excessive dependence on the output of specific network structure layers hinders the emergence of universal schemes. In this paper, we propose the large margin cosine estimation (LMCE) detection scheme to overcome the above shortcomings, making the detection independent and universal. We illustrate the principle of our approach and demonstrate the significance and analysis of some important parameters. Moreover, we model various types of adversarial attacks and establish proposed defense mechanisms against them and evaluate our approach from different aspects. This method has been clearly validated on a range of standard datasets including MNIST, CIFAR-10, and SVHN. The assessment strongly reflects the robustness and pervasive of this approach in the face of various white and semi-white box attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
At present, Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) that occupies the dominant position of artificial intelligence does not admit defeat to all kinds of incurable diseases in the Internet of things (IoT) environment, including biological systems [1] , industry [2] , and robotics [3] and also have achieved the best current accuracy among many artificial intelligence tasks, thus robustness to random disturbances is one of its characteristics. It is generally believed that mistakes made by machines are routine rather than exceptional, and many other mathematical models in the case of machine learning [4] suggest that there are special samples that can completely collapse the algorithm. These examples interfere with the norThe associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Zheng Chang. mal use of DNN-based system, making it fragile and posing a serious risk [5] , [6] . The actual scenes of these attacks are numerous, such as wireless communication [7] , [8] , facial recognition [9] , photos/pictures [10] and autopilot [11] . From the perspective of data manifolds, this means that slight but cleverly selected input disturbances change the data manifold of normal pictures in the physical world, and become so-called adversarial samples(also called antagonistic examples). When data exposed outside the data manifold is trained, DNN can easily be spoofed to classify image errors into other classes. This security breach may lead to a misleading behavior of trained artificial intelligence applications. Many researches have been carried out in order to encourage better attack performance, [6] , [12] - [15] .
Correspondingly, some adversarial sample discovery strategies were proposed [16] , [17] . However, these existing discovery strategies face two limitations. At first, they are low-robustness, which means they can only detect adversarial samples against specified kinds of attacks [18] , [19] . Due to uniformity of their research, if attackers generate adversarial samples using another way, their discovery success rates are mostly not high enough to recover from attacks, even with the existing methods of adversarial attacks, these discovery schemes are not effective against each attack. In addtion, they are non-pervasive, which means these methods require that DNN should contain some specified layers because they want to extract some features from these specified layers. For example, Some methods is only available to DNN which contains Dropout layer, or it will be failed. Thus, some of existed discovery schemes are proved to be invalid only if we want to use a structurally different neural network, which calls for a powerful discovery method. According to a relatively novel approach, if the network structure layer can provide key data features that distinguish the samples, for example, information about the uncertainty of their point estimates, misclassification of the antagonistic samples can be avoided.
Uncontroversially, the focus of this work is to use a new and efficient mathematical model to better estimate this prediction uncertainty in DNN. The mathematical model by which the new feature is selected is the degree to which the sample is deviated from the real sample in the data manifold dimension, and the two selected features are on the two network layers. Although both can be used independently to detect antagonistic samples, the effect of integrated detection is actually better than that of independent detection. We proposed Uncertainty estimates with Large Margin Cosine Estimate method. This novelty scheme, which can be used in any neural network, can effectively detect antagonistic samples in response to various generative adversarial attacks. We combined the Kernel Density Estimate in order to improve the detection success rate. The feature space of the last hidden layer in the training set is used to obtain the feature. This feature require a large number of training samples to ensure that the bandwidth of the approximate kernel density profile is as low as possible. Therefore, the number of samples constrains the accuracy of the calculated features, and the success rate deviation during detection is large. This makes another feature particularly prominent, because its emergence makes up for this deficiency. By inputting two features into a simple logistic regression model, the trained classifier can achieve a considerable improvement in the success rate of detection.
A better ROC-AUC score is obtained than the previous method when detecting an equal number of antagonist samples generated from the same data set using different attacks. Thus, this scheme has advantages over the most advanced solutions available [20] . It achieves higher accuracy in protecting white-box attacks and semi-white box attacks, and solves the problem of low robustness. This is because the well-designed feature dimension space makes a good distinction between samples. In addition, this method is pervasive, it does not require that the DCNN has a special structure because it only needs to know the all classification probabilities of a trained neural network for each sample, so this method can be applied to any DNN. At the same time, the structural design of the algorithm reduces the number of cycles in a calculation process and effectively shorten the calculation time, which is much shorter than the classifier construction time of other discovery methods. In addition, this method is more interpretable because it is distinguishable by the human eye in the feature space.
This paper propose robust pervasive detection approach for adversarial samples based on our previous work [21] .Compared with the previous work, we give fellowing new proposals in this paper.
1) This paper proposes a detailed theoretical analysis and mathematical models of robust pervasive detection approach for adversarial samples. Firstly, from new perspective of the cosine space, adversarial samples are reclassified, and the mathematical background proposed by the method is explained in detail. Then the softmax function formula is revised and discussed to verify the rationality of the LMCE method. After the LMCE usage is described in detail, the value interval of each parameter is derived thoroughly. At the same time, the appearance of Figures 1 and 3 helps explain the classification principle and the derivation process, which is intuitive and clear. Theoretical explanations and discussions about theory on various aspects make the entire defense system more scientific and complete; 2) This paper consolidates the advantages of the LCME detection method and generates and defends three new antagonistic samples that are stronger. Among them, JSMA and C&W are two types of attacks that are difficult to defend. There are few satisfactory defense schemes, and MIM is the type of attack that has just been released, so few people study it. In terms of datasets, sample detection is performed using a larger sample size of the SVHN dataset. The excellent processing speed further demonstrates the advantages of LCME detection in practice. The research data obtained from the experiment enriched the contents of Table 1, Table 2 and Figure 4 , and the discussion of the research results is more fully detailed, which makes the experimental foundation of LCME more solid; 3) This paper has carried out more experiments to made the evaluations more solid, which support the verify the feasibility and efficiency of the theory. The experiments are done to evaluate the optimal choice of detection scheme and the independence of the detection method on the network structure. Moreover, the demonstrations of the spatial distribution of LCME verify the efficiency of the LCME method. The rest of the paper is structured as follows: In Section II we provide the relevant background information for previous research. In Section III we model discovery strategy and propose our approach. Then, we introduce the principle for our approach in Section IV, with a mathematical analysis of LMCE. This leads to our evaluaion and results and in Section V. we draw conclusions in Section VI.
II. THE RELATED WORKS A. GENERATED ATTACK OF ANTAGONISTIC SAMPLES
In turn, deep neural networks can be used to destroy themselves by adding a small amount of perturbation that is difficult to detect by the human eye [5] . Due to high complexity of the problem, researchers turned to find the minimal loss function addition which aims for the misclassification of neural network, which turns the problem into a convex optimization process. Then, a method of calculating the disturbance by back propagation was proposed, named Fast Gradient Sign Method(FGSM) [6] . The large-step operation replaced the original perturbation mode to increase the loss function of the classifier, forming a variant of FGSM, ''a one-step target class'' [12] . Basic Iterative Methods(BIM) [12] increased the times of steps operation and used a smaller step each time. JSMA [13] was proposed form a different perspective, it computed adversarial saliency maps to limited L 0 norm rather than L 2 norm or L ∞ norm, perturbation is consequently inconspicuous. It should be noted that JSMA-generated samples only changes value of several pixels instead of disturbing the whole pictures. On this basis, some attack methods that invalidate the neural network with defensive distillation was proposed by limiting L 0 , L ∞ and L 2 norm [14] . This type of attack is more threatening because the disturbances generated from C&W are portable, which means an antagonistic sample generated from an insecure network can also attack a secure network. Momentum Iterative gradient-based Methods [22] added momentum in the iteration of FGSM, success rate of both white-box and black-box attacks was further improved.
B. DEFENSE PATTERNS FOR ADVERSARIAL SAMPLE
Since the vulnerability was discovered, researchers have been trying to build a single or versatile defense system. Currently, there are three main ideas for defense strategies:
• Modify the training process or modify the input samples during the model learning process.
• Modify the network. E.g. change the loss function or activate the function to add, add more network layers or sub-networks.
• Attaches an external model to the neural network to classify samples generated in an unknown way. As an initial research direction [6] , [23] , reducing the over-fitting by standardizing the network is the goal of the first idea. nevertheless, a new sample can always be found to deceive the network however we repeat the first idea [24] . Even though we use other methods such as data compression [25] and data randomization [26] , The new adversarial samples that keep appearing make these defense methods ridiculous.
As for the second idea, the earliest defensive distillation [27] is proved to be noneffective. Because more sensitive layers contains more sensitive features, adding a well-designed layer before input layer may be effective in some cases [28] . VOLUME 7, 2019 Besides, statistics knowledge of the convolution filters can be useful [29] . However, for an unknown neural network, transforming the structure is not as simple as people think.
Since that not all adversarial attack can be detected, to detect some specific adversarial attack, some additional networks are proposed. For universal perturbation [24] , Perturbation Rectifying Network [30] was designed. For FGSM, the framework of Generative Adversarial Networks [31] can be used train a secure network, this robust method is called GAN-based defense [32] . Besides, There are methods using two external models, such as feature squeezing [33] and Magnet [34] .
There exists some new researches explaining the principle of detection. Density ratio estimation [35] explains that adversaries who try to avoid detection must make the antagonistic image less clammy. A mathematical method called least squares importance fit (LSIF) [36] is used to calculate the density ratio of normal and adversarial samples. This method also has mobility. Using a small sub-network, the detector can augment deep neural networks [20] .
Discovery of adversarial examples remains to be solved [13] . There are some other previous works with respect to the discovery strategy [37] - [41] .
III. PROPOSED SCHEME
In this section, we discuss the distribution of adversarial samples from data manifold. Then we put forward Large Margin Cosine Estimate(LMCE) method, and elucidate it in detail.
A. MODELING OF ADVERSARIAL SAMPLE DISTRIBUTION
The most commonly used dataset for image classification is MNIST dataset. It contains 60,000 samples. The image shows handwritten Arabic numerals of 1 to 10, all of which are composed of lines, and the peripheral part is a large piece of white. Most of the numbers are in the middle of the picture, and there are other implicitly considered unknowable features. Compared with any other non-pure blackand-white digital image, the number of image features of a digital image, that is, the degree of freedom, is usually lower. It can be said that the digital part of the MNIST data set has been compressed into lower dimensional manifolds in terms of image characteristics. A d-manifold is a hyperplane similar to the d dimension in n-dimensional space (n>d). We curl a piece of paper along one edge into an axis. Although we can establish a three-dimensional coordinate system to represent this surface, in fact, it can be reduced to a two-dimensional manifold. The manifold hypothesis assumes that most high-dimensional data sets can be reduced to a lower dimensional manifold. Based on this assumption, if the images are represented in the lower dimensional space of the manifold, they will become simpler. By traversing the submanifolds, adversarial perturbation can be found to push the sample out of the data sub-manifold, thereby changing the real label of the image on the data manifold. Our research is based on a hypothesis that the sample is located around the class boundary near the edge of the data sub-manifold.
That is, each adversarial sample is not on the data submanifold. In fact, DNNs can only be performed correctly near the data sub-manifold.
Since the adversarial sample is not a natural one but a human disturbance, an adversarial attack method will cause a sample point x of class C x to be pushed out of the data manifold and generate a sample point of class C x , x . Since the adversarial sample points are not in the original data sub-manifold and it is pushed around target sub-manifold, no matter how these adversarial samples are generated, these points can be divided into three categories:
• x decouples C x 's data sub-manifold and crosses the classification boundaries, it also stays away from the data sub-manifolds of C x ;
• x decouples C x 's data sub-manifold and crosses the classification boundary. It is close to the data sub-manifold of C x , and the position of x is very far from the classification boundary. Or in the recess of the surface of the data sub-manifold that is close to the classification boundary but embedded in C x ;
• x decouples C x 's data sub-manifolds and crosses the classification boundary. It is close to the data sub-manifold of C x , and the position of x is also very close to the classification boundary. Figure. 1 shows the three distributions of adversarial samples. In general, the decision boundary can be seen as the center line between original data manifold and target data manifold, so there exists only three cases as mentioned above. We focus on the target data manifold rather than the original data manifold. For common data manifolds which are far away from each other, because the adversarial sample itself is not very close to the target data manifold, this kind of adversarial sample is easier to be discovered. However, when it is trapped in the local manifold of target data manifold or it is in the case of having a shorter distance with boundary and target data manifold, it is difficult to detect adversarial samples successfully. Our research uses two methods as an integrated discovery for different adversarial samples. In fact, the proposed large margin cosine estimate method is applicable to all the conditions. The purpose of using integrated discovery methods is to achieve better discovery success rate.
B. PROPOSED ADVERSARIAL SAMPLE DISCOVERY ALGORITHM
The Gaussian process, as a Bayesian model of uncertainty output, is an powerful way to identify low confidence internals of the input space [42] . a dropout-contained DNN is equivalent to an approximation of the deep Gaussian process [43] , which suggests that Uncertainty Estimates can be extracted from dropout-contained DNNs when the training process iterates to convergence. Researcher proposed a new loss function called Large Margin Cosine Loss [44] , improving the recapitulation of DNNs. Believing that the method is versatile, we convert this loss function into a measure of model uncertainty and propose Large Margin Cosine Estimate (LMCE) for detecting adversarial samples. we extract for j = 0 → N do 6: Randomly or sequentially take k samples and calculate the large residual cosine estimate between k samples according to1: 7: LCME ← E lmc 8: end for 9: allLCME ← LCME 10: end for 11: Calculate the variance of all the LCME entries it from DNN in the following way. Note that the formula in Algorithm is defined as:
As shown in the algorithm 1, we first extract the softmax layer from the network structure. This step directly construct model between softmax layer and sample input in order to take out the output of this layer. After that, for a certain trained labeled dataset, we sample T times. Each time, we can get the prediction of each class corresponding to each sample. For all N samples, we calculate the value of E lmc between the k samples iteratively. After iterating N times, it obtains an array of length N. When sampling is finished, we will get T arrays of length N. By calculating the variance between these arrays, the final values of large margin cosine estimate for a test dataset is obtained. By doing the same operation for normal(noisy) and adversarial samples, we get the corresponding arrays. Regarding normal(noisy) samples as negative class and another as positive class, we can train a classifier using a simple machine learning algorithm, e.g. logistic regression. Noisy sample is a way for data augmentation.
The equation 1 is rather critical. For the sample, the predicted value of the target class needs to be subtracted from a parameter value m, while the non-target predicted value remains unchanged. After the range is expanded, this value continues to calculate the softmax loss.
Unlike the application of this formula in other fields, the output layer is used directly instead of the corresponding weight layer. In actual operation, in order to learn the inter-class features more accurately, the estimated value is calculated by using a weighted average of a plurality of samples. Ultimately maximize the characteristics of the class and minimize the in-class features.
Another difference is the elimination of the normalization of the output layer O. The advantage is that the output of the layer can always be considered a low-dimensional data manifold, containing a variety of linear and expanded features, even if the upper layer is not the Dropout layer but other layers, such as the BN layer. However, the role of the superior layer needs to be guaranteed to prevent over-fitting of the model. At the same time, the output can be directly treated as a normalized output vector because the output layer has an output range between 0 and 1.
In this study, the smoothness of the curve depends on the parameter k. The smaller the k value, the closer the estimated value spacing and the smoother the image. However, the impact of the final classification of the classifier is negligible. The general value interval is an integer from 2 to 10. In order to eliminate the influence of the small deviation of each predicted sample on the softmax loss calculation, the existence of the parameter T is reasonable. However, if this method only samples one or two times for E lmc , it can also be ignored.
IV. MATHEMATICAL MODELING FOR LCME METHOD
In this section, we present a theoretical analysis for the proposed LMCE, aiming to clarify the specific meaning of the parameters.
A. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF SUPERIORITY OF LCME
Deep neural networks are mathematically differentiable models. In the training process, back propagation algorithms are usually used to obtain the gradient of each layer to adjust the network parameters. Assume that the neural network input is X , the category label is Y , the network parameter is W , and the output is F(X ) = W * X . When training the neural network, for each input sample X , we repeatedly adjust the network parameter W so that the output value F(X ) tends to the category label Y of the sample. The same method is used to generate adversarial samples. The only difference is that we fix the network parameter W , and repeatedly modify the input sample X so that the output value F(X) tends to the target label Y . This means that we only need to modify the objective function and constraints, and we can use the same method as the training neural network to calculate the adversarial perturbation. For example, the FGSM adversarial attack seeks to reduce the category confidence by searching for the partial loss of the loss function. If the impact of the target category on the loss function is reduced, the loss function will exhibit the same mathematical characteristics as the kernel density estimation method. From another perspective, each large margin cosine estimate uses output and labels of multiple samples for calculation, which is equivalent to estimating the difference between classes, whereas the difference between the normal sample dataset and the adversarial sample dataset is different, so it is intuitive. Hence, this method is effective to discover a wide range of adversarial samples.
Review the estimate value again from the cosine point of view. the derivative of the model loss function relative to the input feature vector is used by FGSM to perturb the magnitude of each feature in the direction of the gradient, where VOLUME 7, 2019 S we uses softmax loss as a general loss function. Soft-max loss distinguishes features from different classes by maximizing the posterior probability of the ground-truth class. For the sake of simplicity, we assume a two-category scenes with classes C 1 and C 2 . Let O 1 and O 2 represent output vectors for C 1 and C 2 , respectively.
For soft-max loss, the decision boundary is defined as:
In the cosine space, the boundary corresponds to the first case as shown in Fig. 2 . Since the unnormalized output vector is determined by the network layer itself,overlapping regions are generated from the common softmax loss function (margin < 0) in the cosine space (Green portion). It can also be understood that since the unnormalized output vector cannot be obtained, the slope of the decision boundary will change in a certain range. Due to the unknown range, the classification boundary will move within this interval. If the angle between the generated adversarial sample x and the output vector happens to be in the overlapping area, the sample x cannot be correctly classified. This explains the three distributions of the antagonistic sample: if the pushed sample is far from the origin (0, 0) and just reaches the green part, it will corresponds to the first case of the distribution of the adversarial sample; if it is far from the origin (0, 0) and is about to cross the green part into the red part, it will corresponds to the second case against the sample distribution; if it is closer to the origin (0, 0) and reaches the green part, it will corresponds to the third distribution of the adversarial sample. Due to the uncertainty of the position of the decision boundary of the cosine space, misclassification of the adversarial samples occurs. Therefore, the boundary is simultaneously constrained by the magnitude of the output vector and the cosine of the angle. In general, the cosine similarity of the classifier is only considered during the test phase. Therefore, although the perturbation is very small in the image dimension, as long as the perturbation is sufficiently significant in the cosine dimension, the points of the overlapping region may be misclassified.
Review the softmax loss function from the cosine space. It corresponds to the last layer of the general neural network architecture, which distinguishes different types of features depending on the posterior probability of maximizing the real category. Define the input feature vector as x i and the corresponding label as y i to represent the softmax loss:
Here, the posterior probability that x i is correctly classified is p i , the training set is N, and the number of sample categories is represented by C. The output of the fully connected layer refers to f j . W j and B j represent the weight and offset of the fully connected layer, respectively. For reasoning simplification, let B j = 0 without affecting the conclusion. From the perspective of cosine, f j can be expressed as:
θ j represents the angle between W j and x. This formula shows that the norm and angle of the weight vector affect the posterior probability. For ease of analysis, we assume that the W norm can be kept constant by normalization and other methods. The training sample's feature vector is useless for the test set. Therefore, let x s be A constant. So the posterior probability only depends on the cosine. The softmax loss function can now be expressed as:
This function is a normalized Softmax loss function, in cosine space, it corrects the decision boundary by:
As shown in the second case of Fig.2 , it can be seen that by eliminating the radial variables, the regularized softmax loss function whose decision boundary is uniquely determined in the cosine space can classify samples perfectly in the cosine space. However, because there is no margin, the decision boundary is sensitive to noise data and it is not robust. Any small-scale disturbance around the decision boundary can cause the classifier to change the classification.
For LMCE, in cosine space, it corrects the decision margin by:
Therefore, when cos(θ 2 ) is reduced to the minimum value of C1, cos(θ 1 ) reaches the maximum value, and the classification works best. C2 is the same. The third picture in 2 illustrates the always-defined decision boundary of the second-modified loss function in the cosine space, ensuring that there is always a margin( √ 2m). It suggests that the boundary determined by LMCE is more robust than that of the softmax loss function, so the classification performance is better. As the boundaries are defined and separated, the sample partitioning is more conclusive, which reduces the impact of small perturbations around the decision boundary (dashed line) on the classification. Regardless of the angle, the cosine margin is valid for all samples.
Next we should analyze the range of values of the parameters, aiming to clarify the specific meaning of the parameters and provide a theoretical basis for the selection of parameters in the subsequent assessment of discovery methods.
B. MATHEMATICAL ANALYSIS FOR MARGIN PARAMETER
When studying the features on the hyper-sphere in the cosine space, the cosine margin should be considered as an additional network that facilitates the selection of features. A quantitative analysis of the limits of the hyper-parameter m is necessary, which represents the actual choice of the cosine margin. Choosing the best value of m helps us identify features more efficiently, and these features tend to be highly variable. Next, the decision boundaries and angle margins in the output dimension are analyzed to arrive at the theoretical limit of the hyperparameter m. First, revisit the case of the two categories C1 and C2, and define the normalized feature vector x. The normalized output vector is O i , the angle between x and O i is θ i . For modified softmax, denote the decision boundary as cosθ 1 − cosθ 2 = 0, which is the angle bisector of O 1 and O 2 , as shown in the first case of 3. This shows that using the normalized softmax cost function, the category is divided into two regions close to each other, where the classification discrimination near the boundary is very vague, and it is acceptable to belong to any class. For LMCE, cosθ 1 − cosθ 2 = m is the decision boundary for C 1 , where θ 1 should be much less than θ 2 and the same for C 2 . Therefore, the class spacing increases and the intraclass distance decreases. As shown in the second case of Fig. 3.   FIGURE 3 . Geometric interpretation of the LCME to the output vector space. The picture shows the output space under the two-class scene. It can be seen that the output space of the LCME is more narrow.
As we can see, the maximum corner margin of the LCME depends on the angle between O 1 and O 2 . Therefore, given O 1 and O 2 , the cosine margin should have a limited range of variables. We consider that in extreme cases, all the output vectors belonging to category i and the corresponding output weight vector O i of category i completely coincide with each other, ie all output vectors are located at the center of their class. In this case, the class area shrinks to a very small fan-shaped area. The margin has been maximized to a strict upper limit. Assume that all classes are completely separate, and C denotes the number of all classes. In order to satisfy the boundary condition cosθ 1 − cosθ 2 m, we constrain the theoretical range of m:
the cosine value of the minimum angle between the output vectors is represented by max(O T i O j ), again emphasizing that the analysis is performed in the unit output vector space. In order to make classification discrimination clear, LCME needs to maximize the angle between the two output vectors of different categories. Therefore, the optimal solution should be the output weight vector uniformly distributed on the unit hyper-sphere. Next we derive the range of the cosine margin m.
The output vector dimension of this study is K = 10, so the following inequality holds:
therefore:
So the range of m is:
If and only if for all i, j(i = j), O T i O j is equivalent and
In this study, no analysis is performed because C K + 1 is not involved.
Reasonably choosing a larger m ∈ [0, C C−1 ) should effectively facilitate the discovery of adversarial samples. However, the parameter m cannot usually reach the theoretical upper limit in practice. From Fig. 3 we can see that when m is too large, the constraints are too difficult to satisfy, so the model can not converge and the classifier will classify noisy sample classification into adversarial samples in a large scale. Therefore, in actual research, m usually does not exceed 1. We continually modify the cosine margin for each type of generated antagonistic sample in the experiment until the highest success rate is found. If system encounters a FGSM attack, the optimal value of m should be 0.25. For other attacks involved in the study, m can be taken as 1. Since the actual type of attack is unknown, we set m = 0.75.
C. MATHEMATICAL ANALYSIS FOR INPUT GENERALIZATION PARAMETER
There existed another parameter, i.e, generalization of x, s. For a normalized softmax loss function, a larger s will result in a smaller loss, while a too small s will even result in a loss of convergence. Observe the classification boundary. Assume that C 1 is a normal sample and C 2 is an adversarial sample. When the adversarial sample is expected to be classified as a normal sample, cos(θ 2 ) − m < cos(θ 2 ), we need to make the adversarial sample be separated from the normal sample. To make the adversarial sample back to the boundary, if we do not set the x norm, we want the right x norm to be smaller, i.e, smaller s so that the boundary will include the perturbation. In order to ensure that there is a margin, we can VOLUME 7, 2019 not blindly reduce s. Although we can adjust parameter m, in order to ensure that the adjustment of m is useful, we need to determine the lower bound of s.
Given the output vector group O of the softmax layer, since the representation of the cosine value involves s itself. To facilitate analysis of the problem, O must be standardized. The total number of categories is C, and P O represents the posterior probability group that is expected to minimize the target category. O i represents the i-th output vector. For i, we have:
where O T i O j represents the cosine value. Counting (12) and summing inequalities for all categories:
1
Since f (x) = e sx is a convex function, follow the Jensen inequality, we get:
Easy to know:
By the formula (15), (16), (17) is:
To simplify:
The formula (19) is true only when it satisfies, for all i, j (i = j), O T i O j are equal, and i O i = 0. Since at most K + 1 normalized output vectors in K-dimensional space satisfy this condition, K is the dimension of the learned feature. In this study, because of K = C, the maintenance condition of this inequality is C K + 1 is always satisfied, so this condition does not need to be considered. At this point, we have determined the scope of the parameter s. From this formula, we can see that we need to increase s when the target category P O against the sample rises. For more data sets of more categories, the choice of s should be larger to cope with the category compactness within the hyper-sphere s caused by the increase in categories.
V. ASSESSMENT
Next we evaluate the discovery method from different perspectives. It mainly evaluates the robustness of the discovery method to all types of counterattacks and the universality of different neural networks. It also includes the comparison between LCME and KDE methods and the comparison between integrated methods and single methods, the influence of parameter selection on discovery results and the interpretability of the integrated method in the feature dimension.
A. MODEL TRAINING AND SAMPLES GENERATING
To evaluate performance using LCME features, we evaluated through standard datasets (MNIST, CIFAR10 and SVHN) and compared results to the Bayesian uncertainty estimation baseline method. The results confirm that even if we only use the LCME value, the score is still high enough, which suggests that our method is believable. In terms of image preprocessing, each pixel in the training image (in [0, 255]) must be scaled to float in the range [0, 1] whether the image is a grayscale image or an RGB image or not. Compared to the baseline approach, our model achieved near-state-of-the-art accuracy on each data set and achieved a higher ROC-AUC score than that of baseline method. In order to unify the evaluation method, only the images that can be correctly classified by the neural network should generate antagonistic samples. The samples that have been misclassified are not in the detection range, because the misclassification at this time is caused by the network itself without artificial attacks. Because JSMA and CW attacks generate very large time-consuming samples, in order to maintain the normal progress of the experiment, we generate and randomly select 1000 samples to verify the accuracy for each test.
For attacking the neural network, we implemented the five attacks in the TensorFlow using the cleverhans library (FGSM, BIM, JSMA, C&W and MIM) [20] . When constructing a neural network, the traditional neural network architecture is adopted in order to quickly collect the experimental results, some intermediate layers are deleted, which makes the accuracy of the classification under the unmanned attack slightly decrease, but this is not our focus because the experiment only makes antagonistic samples for normal samples that the neural network can recognize. The baseline model is implemented [20] . We train the neural network, select the correctly identified samples, generate the adversarial sample to attack neural network, record the classification accuracy after the attack, and compare the results. Here are two ways to explain the A and B of BIM attacks. The A method requires that the iterative process be stopped to save generated sample as long as it causes misclassification. The B method saves the sample after a fixed and sufficient number of iterations, but both methods ensure that most of the samples go beyond the classification boundary. In addition, for each attack, we also produced the same number of Gaussian noise test samples to illustrate the difference between natural and human interference on the neural network. The way is to add Gaussian noise to each pixel. The standard for adding noise is to make the average L2 norm of the perturbation and the average L2 norm of the antagonistic sample as equal as possible. Hence, we need to do this after making antagonistic sample. Because the sample generation methods of JSMA and CW are different from others, the two attack methods do not generate corresponding Gaussian noise samples. Since that JSMA and C&W flip pixels to their min or max values, noisy samples are crafted in another way, which flips pixels randomly with the same number as pixels that were altered in the adversarial samples. For FGSM and BIM, the L 2 norm of noise is usually between 5 and 10, so the added noise perturbation is relatively small, nearly same as the normal sample, but for MIM, For the CW and JSMA type of samples, the value of the L 2 norm for noise is usually above 10, resulting in a large degree of pixel change. Model accuracy will be greatly reduced due to the performance of adversarial sample in the original model. This makes it difficult for the algorithm to distinguish between noise samples and adversarial samples. Therefore, more stringent requirements are placed on the selection of parameters in the discovery algorithm. Even though, we should regard noisy samples as normal samples since it is different with adversarial samples in the way of generating. Table 1 lists model accuracy on the adversarial sets and the size of average perturbation. Generated adversarial sample images are not listed. Check it if you want [20] .
The optimizer uses Adadelta. The neural network structure used for different datasets is also different. For convenience, MNIST and SVHN data sets require LeNet [45] . CIFAR-10 requires the number of middle layers to be deepened to 12. The classification accuracy of the trained network for MNIST and CIFAR-10 is 99.08% and 80.33%, respectively. SVHN reports 91.93% accuracy on normal samples. The baseline model is only applicable to deep neural networks that contain the Dropout layer. This experiment uses a neural network structure that is different from the CIFAR-10 dataset and removes all Dropout layers in the original deep neural network. Adding a batch-normalization layer at the end of each convolution block prevents over-fitting of the model. CIFAR-10 with BN layer reports 81.30% accuracy on normal samples. Bandwidth of kernel density estimate for different neural networks are determined by grid search method. We set Bandwidth 1.20 for MNIST dataset, 0.26 for CIFAR-10 and 1.00 for SVHN.
Characteristically, the antagonistic sample has a larger LCME value and a smaller kernel. In fact, LCME can be seen as another form of uncertainty. Them we should detect antagonistic samples using them.
B. ADVERSARIAL SAMPLE DETECTOR EVALUATION
After obtaining the values of the two features, we can use logistic regression to generate the classifier. In theory, we can also use other simple machine learning algorithms to generate the classifier. We evaluate the performance of the classifier from various aspects. Figure. 5(a) shows the performance of a classifier using a single feature and a classifier used by both features. Obviously, the latter's ROC value will be higher. Hence, the latter evaluation only discusses the integrated classifier. First, use labeled sample, where the antagonist sample is a positive class, and the normal sample and the noise sample together form a negative class. The LCME value and the density estimate are calculated and labeled to become a training set and then train it using a logistic regression model. The values of these two features were normalized prior to training. Besides, for validating the versatility, We modify the neural network and delete all Dropout layers. Instead, we use the BN layer VOLUME 7, 2019 to prevent the model from overfitting. Figure. 5(b) shows the classification effects with different CNN structures on CIFAR-10 dataset with FGSM attack. We choose CIFAR-10 with FGSM attack because we want to validate the versatility on dataset which has a worst performance in a worst attack approach. To confirm that LCME is suitable for neural networks without the Dropout layer, we use the structure of neural network on CIFAR-10 dataset by removing all Dropout layer and adding BN layer at the end of each convolution layer, then we craft a FGSM attack towards the network and use the same discovery method. The result illustrated that using a neural network with a BN layer, its discovery success rate against adversarial sample is even higher than that of a neural network using the Dropout layer. This shows that no matter what structure the neural network uses, it will not invalidate the discovery algorithm, but it will affect the discovery success rate. However, the discovery rate can be adjusted using the selection of m and s. Hence, it also reflects the advantage our approach has compared with the previous method, that is, our method does not depend on a specific network structure but only all outputs of the last layer. One thing that have a significant impact on classification performance is the choice of hyperparameters m in LCME. m ∈[0, C C−1 ). Because the reasonable choice of m should be able to stimulate the function of learning the highly differentiated features. Note that the theoretical upper limit of the parameter m is not chosen because the feature space disappears. The optimal value of m varies with the attack mode. In the experiment, we only need to adjust the value of m according to the experimental results to get the optimal value of each situation, so that these values can be referenced to make a choice when facing the comprehensive defense. Moreover, too large m will get a more stringent cosine constraint, and even unacceptable, and eventually the model will not converge. Inevitably, the training process is often more sensitive to noise data, especially if the margin is a cosine constraint of m. At this point the classifier may prefer to treat the noise sample as an antagonistic sample rather than the normal sample. When training a SVHN classifier with a FGSM attack, if m is the same as the MNIST classifier with FGSM, it will not perform well or even crash. The solution is to use a larger m. Figure. 6(b) shows the effect of the value of the parameter m on the performance of the classifier. Experiments have shown that for FGSM, a small m of less than 0.2 is better. In fact, it is true for FGSM and JSMA. For other attacks, it is best to choose a larger m. For other confrontational attacks, setting it to 1 is the best choice. On the other hand, Figure. 6(a) shows that the results using different values of s reaches equal ROC-AUC scores with CW attack on MNIST dataset, suggesting when s is big enough, the selection of s has a slight influence. However, the selection of s should follows the range which we have derived. If s is too small and cross the lower bound, the algorithm will work down. In general, s should be approximately larger than 10.
We can generate ROC for each method,because the classifier is based on thresholds. Figure. 6(b) also shows the perfor- mance of the original classifier and the comprehensive classifier on the MNIST dataset. Compared with the original classifier, the integrated classifier has a higher ROC value and the curve is closer to the upper left, indicating that the classification effect using LCME is more perfect. Hence, our approach performs better than original approach. Then, we expand the scope of discovery using different attacks. Figure. 4 shows the ROC curve and AUC scores for the antagonistic samples generated by various methods in different datasets when using the classifier. Although there is a classifier getting 74.04 %, this is still higher than the detection value of the baseline method. In other cases, the score still occupies a high position, in some cases it even arrives 99%. Table 2 shows the ROC-AUC scores of baseline model. We implement it based on the same configuration. The result is all lower than original record. We compare experimental results with this table rather than that written in initial paper. Since the new method captures high scores in each case, the algorithm outperforms the baseline model with its universality and high detection rate.
The above ROC-AUC scores suggests that the ensemble classifier is able to detect adversarial samples effectively from a wide range of attacks on a wide range of datasets. For the effectiveness of this algorithm, we can intuitively feel from the last step of the discovery algorithm, that is, the construction of the classifier. Figure. 7 shows the the distribution of kernel density estimates and LCME values of samples in the classification space. Red represents the negative class which stands for adversarial samples. Blue represents the positive class which stands for noisy samples and normal samples. Obviously, the corresponding values of the normal sample in the two feature dimensions are compact and concentrated, while the adversarial samples are loosely distributed, and the value distribution range of the adversarial sample is not the same as the normal sample, which means the range is even larger. At the same time, when mapping the distribution to the kernel density estimation plane, there will be a large overlap in the middle area, so the kernel density estimate does not effectively discriminate adversarial sample. When the distribution is mapped to the LCME plane, the overlapped middle area is not so obvious, and the samples can be classified by a simple machine-learning algorithm. It can be said that our method finds the best measurement of uncertainty.
VI. CONCLUSION
This work proposed a novel adversarial samples discovery algorithm, Large Margin Cosine Estimate, to enhance the robustness and pervasive of DNNs in IoT environments. This method is widely and efficiently applied to various sample defenses, and a more complete defense system is combined with a more targeted KDE solution. The evaluation shows that the classifiers generated by this method in extreme cases can even detect all hostile samples almost perfectly. This greatly improves the security performance of the neural network. Our method is intuitively interpretable in feature dimensions. In addition, it has strong robustness and universality, which means it can get higher discovery success rate for most of known attacks, at the same time it does not depend on any particular network structure layer but only the output of the last layer. Also, it consume less time for reducing the times of cycling. Our work is significant for protection the security of artificial intelligence.
